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 REGULATING SHORT SELLING IN EUROPE AFTER THE 
CRISIS 
 
Rodolphe B. Elineau
*
 
 
 
 
Abstract  
Short selling contributes to the efficient functioning of capital markets. 
While bullish investors tend to hold long positions, bearish investors act 
on information by shorting stock, thereby fostering the incorporation of 
good and bad information into stock prices. Yet short sellers are ill-
viewed by corporate officers, directors, and financial market authorities. 
In the midst of the 2008 global financial crisis, several financial market 
authorities in the European Union issued emergency orders to crack 
down on short sellers, which resulted in a fragmented approach to short 
selling and created a case for regulatory action at the European Union 
level. This Article reviews the Regulation of the European Parliament 
and of the Council of 14 March 2012 on Short Selling and Certain 
Aspects of Credit Default Swaps. While the need to shed light on short 
selling further supports the need for regulatory action, there appears to be 
some cause for concern as “government hubris” might be destructive. 
  
                                                        
* LL.M., Harvard Law School; M.B.A. (Grande École), ESSEC Business School (Paris, 
France); Advanced Master’s degree in business law, Panthéon-Assas University (Paris, France).  
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“They say ‘there are no atheists in foxholes.’ 
Perhaps, then, there are also no libertarians in crises.” 
James Frankel
1
 
 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. The Mechanics of Short Selling 
 Short selling is commonly defined as the practice of selling a 
security the seller does not own at the time of the sale. A short seller can 
sell a security she does not own using the securities lending market. Two 
different strategies might be followed. In a covered short sale, the seller 
borrows or makes arrangements to borrow the security prior to the short 
sale. Conversely, in an uncovered or naked short sale, the seller neither 
borrows nor makes arrangements to borrow prior to the short sale but 
borrows and delivers the security to the buyer by the settlement date, 
usually three business days after the trade date. In both strategies, the 
short seller will close out the position by repurchasing and returning the 
same security to the lender.  
 The definition of short selling laid out in the Regulation on Short 
Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps (the Regulation) 
does not represent a departure from this widely accepted definition. 
Under Article 2(1)(b) of the Regulation, a  
 
“short sale” in relation to a share or debt instrument means any 
sale of the share or debt instrument which the seller does not 
own at the time of entering into the agreement to sell including 
such a sale where at the time of entering into the agreement to 
sell the seller has borrowed or agreed to borrow the share or debt 
instrument for delivery at settlement . . . .
2
 
 
 Likewise, Rule 200(a) of Regulation SHO, which sets forth the 
United States's regulatory framework  governing short sales, refers to 
“any sale of a security which the seller does not own or any sale which is 
                                                        
1 James Frankel, Responding to Crises, 27 CATO J. 165, 165 (2007). 
2 2012 O.J. (L 87) 236/2012, available at http://eur-
lex.europa.eu/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=OJ:L:2012:086:0001:0024:EN:PDF [hereinafter 
Regulation]. 
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consummated by the delivery of a security borrowed by, or for the 
account of the seller.”3 
 A short seller makes a profit () if she sells the borrowed security 
for a price (S) higher than what she pays to return the security to the 
lender (R):  = S – R, as shown by the downward sloping curve in the 
graph below.  
 
 
Short Sellers’ Payoff Profile 
 
 The downward sloping curve makes it clear that short sellers expect 
stock prices to decline. Consider short selling a security for $S. The short 
seller will make a profit if she pays less than $S to return the security to 
the lender, for example $R’, but suffer a loss if she pays more than $S to 
return the security to the lender, for example $R’’. A short seller usually 
bears indirect costs (C) such as lending fees paid to the securities lender. 
As a consequence, a short seller must be able to cover these costs in 
order to earn a profit; that is, pay less than S’ to return the borrowed 
security. Here,  = S’ − R, with S’ = S − C. 
                                                        
3 17 C.F.R. § 242.200 (2012). 
Profit (Π) 
Loss (Π) 
Share Price 
S 
Π max = S’ 
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 Short selling is highly risky. The outcome of such trading strategy 
relies on stock price evolution, and short sellers have limited upside 
potential profit but no downside protection. While the potential profit is 
capped at S (or S’), the potential loss is unlimited. Thus, short selling is 
much riskier than similar bearish strategies using put options, where both 
profits and losses are capped.  
B. History of Short Selling and its Regulation 
 Short selling has always drawn the attention of regulators, 
particularly in the European Union. The first regulation on short selling 
was enacted in Holland in 1610. One year before in 1609, Isaac Le 
Maire, a Dutch businessman, founded a secret association—“Groote 
Company”—in order to short the shares of the Dutch East India 
Company in anticipation of the incorporation of a new rival French 
company,
4
 sending the company’s price into a plunge. Only eight years 
after the founding of the Amsterdam Stock Exchange, Dutch authorities 
outlawed all short sales.  
 Every crisis has unleashed political disdain for short sellers and 
prompted regulators to introduce curbs or outright bans on short selling. 
In 1932, Herbert Hoover, then-President of the United States, required an 
inquiry into short selling and expressed fears that “destructive short 
sellers” were “preventing an economic rebound.”5 In 1997, Crédit 
Lyonnais, a French bank, was blamed for short selling after the collapse 
of Malaysia’s stock market and currency.6 In the aftermath of the 2008 
global financial crisis (the Crisis), critics of short selling are no different. 
Regulating short selling, which represents roughly 1 to 3 percent of 
market capitalization in Europe,
7
 remains a stormy debate and a 
controversial issue.  
                                                        
4 Arturo Bris, William Goetzmann, & Ning Zhu, Efficiency and the Bear: Short Sales and 
Markets Around the World (Yale ICF, Working Paper No. 02-45, 2004). 
5 RON CHERNOW, THE HOUSE OF MORGAN 351–52 (Grove Press ed., 2010). 
6 Daniel Trotta, Short Sellers Have Been the Villain for 400 Years, REUTERS, Sept. 26, 2008, 
available at http://www.reuters.com/article/2008/09/26/us-financial-shortselling-villainspics-
idUSTRE48P7CS20080926.   
7Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and Credit Default Swaps, MEMO/10/409 (Sept. 
15, 2010), available at 
.http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=MEMO/10/409&format=HTML&aged=1
&language=EN&guiLanguage=en. 
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C. The E.U. Approach to Short Selling During the Crisis 
 The European Union’s response to the recent financial crisis was 
disorganized and inconsistent across countries. At the height of the Crisis 
in September 2008, after the rescue of Bear Stearns and the bankruptcy 
of Lehman Brothers, regulators in several E.U. countries (Member 
States) issued temporary emergency orders as they grappled with how to 
deal with the Crisis. Indeed, they decided to crack down on bearish short 
sellers, which resulted in a fragmented approach to short selling across 
the European Union between 2008 and 2009.
8
 These approaches 
included bans on the short selling of financial stocks,
9
 bans on the short 
selling of all listed stocks,
10
 bans on the naked short selling of financial 
stocks,
11
 bans on the naked short selling of all listed stocks,
12
 disclosure 
of net short positions in financial stocks,
13
 and disclosure of net short 
positions in all listed stocks.
14
 
 The approach to short selling was also chaotic within some Member 
States, which added a sense of uncertainty to the Crisis that was roiling 
in the financial markets. In particular, Italy successively banned (i) naked 
short sales of financial stocks from September 23, 2008 to September 30, 
2008; (ii) short sales of financial stocks from October 1, 2008 to October 
9, 2008; (iii) short sales of all stocks from October 10, 2008 to December 
31, 2008; (iv) short sales of financial stocks and stocks of companies 
increasing their outstanding share capital from January 1, 2009 to 
January 31, 2009; (v) naked short sales of all stocks from January 1, 
2009 to July 31, 2009; (vi) short sales of financial stocks and stocks of 
companies increasing their outstanding share capital from February 1, 
2009 to May 31, 2009; and (vii) short sales of stocks of companies 
increasing their outstanding share capital from June 1, 2009 to July 31, 
2009.
15
 
                                                        
8 Seraina Gruenewald, Alexander Wagner & Rolf Weber, Emergency Short Selling Restrictions 
on the Course of the Financial Crisis (June 22, 2010)(unpublished working paper), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=1441236. 
9 Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxembourg, and Portugal. Id. at 7–13. 
10 Italy and the Netherlands. Id. at 11–13. 
11 Denmark, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Norway, and the United Kingdom (the “UK”). Id. 
9–16. 
12 Austria, Greece, and Italy. Id. at 7–11. 
13 Belgium, France, Germany, Ireland, Portugal, Spain, and the UK. Id. at 8–16. 
14 Greece, Hungary, and Spain. Id. at 10, 15. 
15 The ban was extended sine die on August 1, 2009. See CONSOB Resolution No. 16971 
(July 28, 2009), available at 
http://www.consob.it/mainen/documenti/english/resolutions/res16971.htm. 
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 Moreover, these temporary emergency orders might well have been 
illegal in some Member States. Particularly, Bonneau argued that the 
French Autorité des Marchés Financiers (AMF) had no legal authority to 
ban short selling activity during the crisis.
16
 Lawyers tend to think that 
issues of legal authority do matter, even in the midst of a severe global 
financial crisis, and such a dismissive attitude raised some concern. 
D. The E.U. Regulatory Approach in the Aftermath of the Crisis. 
 During the aftermath of the Crisis, regulatory agencies tried to create 
a more consistent approach to short selling. On March 14, 2012, the 
Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps 
was adopted by the European Parliament and the Council. The 
Regulation aimed at harmonizing the rules applicable to short selling 
across the European Union and clarifying the powers of competent 
regulators. To that purpose, the European Commission and the European 
Parliament used a regulation, which is binding in its entirety and directly 
applicable in all Member States, as opposed to a directive, which is only 
binding as to the result to be achieved and leaves to the national 
authorities the choice of form and methods.
17
 The Regulation is 
enforceable throughout the European Union, without the need for further 
legal thinking by any Member State. Cooperation between the European 
Commission and Member States has been crucial since the Regulation 
has been passed by the European Parliament and adopted by the Council 
in accordance with the ordinary legislative co-decision procedure.  
                                                        
16 Thierry Bonneau, Crise financière: l'AMF hors la loi... Pour la bonne cause, 5 REVUE DE 
DROIT BANCAIRE ET FINANCIER [REV. DR. BANC. FIN.] 12 (2008)(Fr.). The French Banking and 
Financial Regulation Act, passed on October 22, 2010, entrusted the French AMF with the legal 
authority to prohibit short selling. On August 25, 2011, pursuant to article L. 421-16 of the French 
Monetary and Financial Code (Code monétaire et financier), the French AMF banned short selling 
of certain financial stocks (April Group, Axa, BNP Paribas, CIC, CNP Assurances, Crédit Agricole, 
E.U.ler Hermès, Natixis, Scor and Société Générale). The ban was extended for three months on 
November 11, 2011, pursuant to a decree of the French Ministry of Finance. Moreover, article 223-
37 of the General Regulation of the AMF was amended. This article requires the notification to the 
AMF of any net short position that becomes equal or greater than 0.2, 0.3, or 0.4 percent of the 
capital of a company whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market or traded on an 
organized multilateral trading facility. Moreover, any short position that becomes equal or greater 
than 0.5 percent must be publicly disclosed, as well as any increments of 0.1 percent. 
17Consolidated Version of The Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union art. 288, Mar. 
30, 2010, 2010 O. J. (C 83) 171-72. 
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E. The U.S. Response to the Crisis 
 In contrast to the European Union’s response, the U.S. Congress did 
not address the issue of short selling in a specific law or regulation, nor 
did it design a ready-to-use set of rules in the aftermath of the Crisis. 
Instead, the U.S. Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) was given 
broad authority to regulate further short sale transactions by the Dodd-
Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act, which was 
signed into law by President Obama on July 21, 2010. Particularly, 
Section 929X gives the SEC the authority to, inter alia, design new 
disclosure requirements and rules necessary or appropriate to ensure that 
the appropriate enforcement options and remedies are available against 
manipulative short selling. When relevant, this Article will compare the 
E.U. and U.S. approaches. 
F. Short Selling and Market Efficiency 
 Short sellers are usually considered to be greedy speculators reaping 
the benefits of bearish financial markets at the expense of the general 
welfare. In particular, corporate officers and directors are hostile to short 
sellers. Richard Fuld, then-CEO of Lehman Brothers, was quoted as 
saying, “I will hurt the shorts, and that is my goal.”18 This statement, 
made a few months before the collapse of Lehman Brothers, gives an 
accurate sense of how ill-viewed short sellers are in the corporate 
community. Indeed, short selling conveys bad information to the markets 
about a particular security, worries long investors, and puts corporate 
officers and directors in the hot seat. Corporations often blame short 
sellers for their financial woes rather than admit management’s flaws. 
Lamont studied the methods used by firms to impede short selling and 
prop up their stock price. These methods include soliciting legal actions 
from regulatory authorities and disrupting the securities lending markets 
to prevent would-be short sellers from borrowing stocks by using 
belligerent statements claiming that “short sellers are acting improperly 
to cause the stock price to go down.”19 Is short selling really a disruptive 
trading strategy hurting the formation of market stock prices? Not 
necessarily. 
                                                        
18 Andrew R. Sorkin, Lehman Brothers Takes on Rumors by ‘The Shorts’, N.Y. TIMES, July 8, 
2008. 
19 Owen Lamont, Go Down Fighting: Short Sellers vs. Firms (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, 
Working Paper No. 10659, 2004). 
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 Academic literature provides strong evidence showing that short 
selling contributes to the efficiency of financial markets. Following 
Fama’s insight, a market is efficient when prices “fully reflect available 
information.”20 Three different forms of market efficiency might be 
considered, depending on the types of information that are expected to be 
incorporated into stock prices: a “weak” form where a security’s price 
reflects all information conveyed by past prices; a “semi-strong” form 
where a security’s price reflects all publicly available information; and a 
“strong” form where a security’s price reflects all available information, 
whether public or private.
21
 Gilson and Kraakman explain that markets 
cannot be efficient in the “strong” form because the costs of acquiring 
private, non-public information are too high.
22
 On the other hand, 
mandatory disclosure rules make information about an issuer available to 
investors at a very low cost. Investors act on information
23
 and a 
security’s price therefore reflects such publicly available information, 
strengthening the efficiency of financial markets in the semi-strong form. 
 There are also two aspects of market efficiency—informational 
efficiency and allocational efficiency. Informational efficiency describes 
how fast the information is incorporated into market prices. Allocational 
efficiency describes the best allocation of resources in the market.
24
 Even 
though all investors are given the very same information through 
mandatory disclosure rules, investors have heterogeneous beliefs. While 
long investors can be seen as optimistic (they expect the price of a 
security to soar), short sellers can be deemed pessimistic (they expect the 
price of a security to fall). Following Miller’s intuition, when investors 
disagree about the value of a security, any constraints on informed 
bearish short sellers leads to overpriced securities.
25
 Without short sellers 
acting on bad information, a security’s price does not fully reflect 
available information and financial markets can no longer be deemed 
                                                        
20 Eugene F. Fama, Efficient Capital Markets: A Review of Theory and Empirical Work, 25 J. 
FIN. 383, 383 (1970) (internal quotation marks omitted). 
21 Id. 
22 See Ronald Gilson & Reiner Kraakman, The Mechanisms of Market Efficiency, 70 VA. L. 
REV. 549, 607 (1984). 
23 Ray Ball, The Global Financial Crisis and the Efficient Market Hypothesis: What Have We 
Learned?, 21 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 8, 10 (2009) (This article argues that if investors do not act on 
information, the market would no longer be efficient. The argument that no one should act on 
information “confuses a statement about an equilibrium ‘after the dust settles’ and the actions 
required to obtain that equilibrium.”). 
24 JAMES COX, ROBERT HILLMAN & DONALD LANGEVOORT, SECURITIES REGULATION – 
CASES AND MATERIALS 107 (Aspen Publishers ed., 2009). 
25 Edward M. Miller, Risk, Uncertainty, and Divergence of Opinion, 32 J. FIN. 1151, 1162 
(1977). 
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efficient. Therefore, promoting short selling is a way to promote market 
efficiency. Moreover, most research also suggests that short sales ensure 
a smooth functioning of financial markets. Particularly, short sellers 
create liquidity when they sell, borrow, and repurchase securities on the 
market. Market makers also use short selling to fill clients’ orders with 
respect to securities that are not immediately available and thus provide 
liquidity to the market. Short selling is also a commonly used hedging 
strategy that insures the rest of a given portfolio against a decline in 
stock prices. Finally, by giving the opportunity to pessimistic investors to 
act on information, short selling mitigates the formation of market 
bubbles.  
 However, researchers in behavioral economics found that stock 
prices exhibit more volatility than suggested by the efficient market 
hypothesis. As Shiller put it, “markets contain quite substantial 
noise,”26 putting the state of equilibrium in jeopardy. Markets may be 
prone to “irrational exuberance,”27 and therefore be irrationally unstable. 
Regulation of short selling cannot ignore these critics. 
G. The Case for Regulatory Action.  
 What is the rationale for government intervention? Why should short 
selling be regulated in the first place? There is no evidence that short 
sellers caused the Crisis or Lehman Brothers’ end. On the contrary, with 
respect to Lehman Brothers, Warren Buffet suggested that blaming short 
sellers was indicative of a failure to admit one’s own problem.28 
Likewise, Thomas Baxter, Jr., General Counsel of the Federal Reserve 
Bank of New York, saw good cause in shorting Lehman
29
 and Richard 
Posner has argued that “there was not enough short selling to alert the 
market and the U.S. government to the weakness of the banks, in part 
because . . . short selling is a risky investment strategy.”30 However, the 
Crisis revealed at least one market failure that has to be fixed at the E.U. 
level—market participants did not take the appropriate steps to shed light 
on short selling. Opaqueness was a vast problem during the Crisis and 
                                                        
26 Robert Shiller, From Efficient Markets Theory to Behavioral Finance, 17 J. ECON. PERSP. 
83, 90 (2003). 
27 Id. 
28 Report of Anton R. Valukas, Examiner, In re Lehman Brothers Holdings Inc., No. 08-13555, 
(JMP), at 665 (Bankr. S.D.N.Y. Mar. 11, 2010). 
29 Id. 
30 RICHARD POSNER, A FAILURE OF CAPITALISM – THE CRISIS OF ’08 AND THE DESCENT INTO 
DEPRESSION 147 (Harvard University Press ed., 2009). 
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prompted many regulators to intervene in their own jurisdiction. 
Regulating short selling at the E.U. level should harmonize the current 
fragmented approach without jeopardizing market efficiency. E.U. 
authorities should therefore shed light on short selling without 
discouraging short sellers or allowing interference with market allocation 
of resources. As Frankel put it: 
 
[C]rises should not become an excuse for public policy that is 
hasty or ill-informed, or that serves primarily the interests of the 
policymakers themselves or of special interests. The response 
must be appropriate and careful. It must be informed by the 
longer term perspective offered in the lessons of historical 
precedent, particularly regarding the fallibility of well-
intentioned government intervention, and by an awareness of the 
dangers identified in the theory of moral hazard.
31
 
   
 Against this background, we can now examine the Regulation’s 
approach. The Regulation takes a tough stance on short selling, arguing 
that it “could aggravate the downward spiral in the prices of shares, 
notably in financial institutions, in a way which could ultimately threaten 
their viability and create systemic risks.”32 More than four hundred years 
after the Dutch authorities outlawed short selling, E.U. lawmakers are 
still wary of short sellers. What it means for the efficiency of financial 
markets within the European Union is uncertain, but there appears to be 
some cause for concern. 
 
II. IMPLEMENTATION OF ENHANCED TRANSPARENCY RULES 
 
 The Regulation promotes transparency of short selling using two 
different sets of rules: a two-tier disclosure regime of net short positions 
(A), and considering the marking of orders as short sales (B).  
 
A. Two-Tier Disclosure Regime of Net Short Positions 
 
                                                        
31 Frankel, supra note 1, at 165. 
32 The fear that short selling could create systemic risks is mentioned three times at the very 
beginning of the Regulation. Regulation, supra note 2, at  
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 For companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a trading 
venue (that is, a regulated market or a multilateral trading facility
33
 in the 
European Union), the Regulation provides for a two-tier model for 
transparency of net short positions relying on private notifications to the 
regulator and disclosures to the public. In comparison, since the 
expiration of “Form SH Order” on August 1, 2009,34 the SEC is relying 
on several Self-Regulatory Organizations (SROs) to increase 
transparency surrounding short selling activity. SROs provide website 
disclosures with respect to daily aggregate short selling volume in each 
individual security and anonymized information regarding individual 
short sales transactions on a one-month delayed basis. The appointed 
SROs are BATS Exchange, Direct Edge Holdings, FINRA, International 
Securities Exchange, NASDAQ Stock Market, NASDAQ OMX BX, 
National Stock Exchange, New York Stock Exchange, NYSE Amex, and 
NYSE Arca. The SEC also discloses bimonthly the aggregate net balance 
of shares that failed to be delivered as of a particular settlement date. 
This fails-to-deliver data is disclosed on the SEC website for all equity 
securities.
35
  
 
1. Prelude: What is a Net Short Position? 
 
 Under Article 3(4) of the Regulation, a net short position is obtained 
by deducting any “long position” from any “short position.”36 Holding a 
share creates a long position while short selling a share creates a short 
position. The Regulation goes further to prevent traders from 
                                                        
33 See Article 4(1)(15) of the Directive 2004/39 of the European Parliament and of the Council 
of April 21, 2004 on Markets of Financial Instruments, explaining that “multilateral trading facility” 
means a multilateral system, operated by an investment firm or a market operator, which brings 
together multiple third‐party buying and selling interests in financial instruments—in the system and 
in accordance with non‐discretionary rules—in a way that results in a contract in accordance with 
the provisions of Title II of the Directive. 
34 On September 18, 2008, the SEC issued an emergency order, the "Form SH Order." Form 
SH required institutional investment managers that exercise "investment discretion" with respect to 
accounts holding "section 13(f) securities" (i.e., equity securities of a class described in section 
13(d)(1) of the Act that are admitted to trading on a national securities exchange or quoted on the 
automated quotation system of a registered securities association) having an aggregate value of at 
least $100,000,000 to file Form SH with the SEC. Form SH was filed electronically on the last 
business day of every week immediately following a week in which the manager effected short sales. 
Form SH required the disclosure of the gross number of the securities sold short during the day. 
35 The short sale volume and transaction data are available at 
http://www.sec.gov/answers/shortsalevolume.htm. The fails-to-deliver data are available at 
http://www.sec.gov/foia/docs/failsdata.htm. Press Release, U.S. Sec. & Exch. Comm’n, SEC Takes 
Steps to Curtail Abusive Short Sales and Increase Market Transparency (July 27, 2009), available at 
http://sec.gov/news/press/2009/2009-172.htm. 
36 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 3(4). 
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circumventing the law using options, futures, contract for differences, 
and credit default swaps, even if such alternative strategies are usually 
costlier for traders. Therefore, entering into a transaction which creates 
or relates to a financial instrument and confers a financial advantage in 
the event of a decrease (or increase) in the price of the share is deemed to 
create a short (or long) position.
37
 As a consequence, traders will not be 
able to use strategies based on the put-call parity (which involves buying 
a put, writing a call, and selling a bond to obtain the same payoff as 
shorting a security in efficient capital markets).
38
 The transparency 
regime is also designed to cover over-the-counter short selling, as long as 
a net short position is created with respect to shares admitted to trading 
on a trading venue in the European Union. Appropriately, the two-tier 
disclosure regime applies whether short sellers, either natural or legal 
persons, are residing or established within or outside the European 
Union.  
 Short sellers are required to quickly notify or disclose net short 
positions. The calculation of a net short position shall be made at 
midnight at the end of the trading day and the notification or disclosure 
shall be made by 15:30 hours (3:30 p.m.) on the next trading day.
39
 Such 
a short notice requirement seems fundamental because a lot of short 
positions are short term and the notification or disclosure of closed-out 
short positions is of little interest. In the notification or disclosure form, 
short sellers shall list their identity (more on this later), the size of the 
relevant position, the targeted issuer, and the date on which the relevant 
position was created, changed, or ceased to be held.
40
 
 This transparency model does not apply to all short sales in shares. 
First, it does not apply to shares admitted to trading on a trading venue in 
the European Union when the principal venue for the shares (that is, the 
venue with the highest turnover) is outside the European Union.
41
 
Second, it does not apply to market-making activities, pursuant to which 
an investment firm or credit institution acts as principal in a financial 
instrument.
42
 Market-making activities include (i) posting firm, 
simultaneous two-way quotes of comparable size and at competitive 
                                                        
37 Id. arts. 3(1)–3(2). 
38 C(t) + K.B(t, T) = P(t) +S(t) ;  And  -S(t) = P(t) – C(t) – K.B(t),  With: C(t) the value of the 
call at time t, P(t) the value of the put at time t, S(t) the value of the security, K the strike price, B(t, 
T) the value of the bond maturing at time T. 
39 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 9(2). 
40 Id. art. 9(1). 
41 Id. art. 16(1). 
42 Id. art. 17(1). 
INTERNATIONAL LAW & MANAGEMENT REVIEW                           VOLUME 8 
 
73 
 
prices, with the result of providing liquidity on a regular and ongoing 
basis to the market; (ii) fulfilling orders, as part of the usual business, 
initiated by clients or in response to clients’ requests to trade; and (iii) 
hedging positions arising out of those dealings.
43
  
 Third, it does not apply to short sales entered into or net short 
positions created in relation to the carrying out of a stabilization scheme 
under a specific commission regulation.
44
 This regulation emphasizes 
that “stabilization transactions mainly have the effect of providing 
support for the price of an offering of relevant securities during a limited 
time period if they come under selling pressure, thus alleviating sales 
pressure generated by short term investors and maintaining an orderly 
market in the relevant securities.”45 Since short selling does not provide 
support for a security’s price, does this exemption really make sense? 
During a significant offering, when the number of relevant securities is 
not sufficient to satisfy all potential investors, an underwriter can, as 
provided in the underwriting agreement, short sell the relevant securities 
so that the underwriter could accept a number of purchases greater than 
the number of securities initially offered (overallotment facility). The 
underwriter is at risk like any short seller if the price of the securities 
soars. However, such risk is limited because the issuer usually grants the 
underwriter an option to purchase up to a certain amount of relevant 
securities at the offer price for a certain period of time after the offer (a 
green shoe option). The exercise of overallotment and green shoe options 
are deemed “ancillary stabilization.”46 Therefore, short sales can be part 
of a stabilization scheme and the exemption of the Regulation makes 
sense. 
 
2. Notification of Net Short Positions 
 
 Article 5 of the Regulation requires a short seller who has a net short 
position to notify the relevant competent authority whenever this position 
reaches or falls below 0.2 percent of the issued share capital of the 
company. A short seller shall also provide notification for every 
increment of 0.1 percent by which the position increases. The relevant 
                                                        
43 Id. art. 2(1)(k). 
44 Commission Regulation 2273/2003, Implementing Directive 2003/6/EC of the European 
Parliament and of the Council as Regards Exemptions for Buy-Back Programmes and Stabilisation 
of Financial Instruments, art. 2(12), 2003 O.J. (L 336) 33, 35.  
45 Id. at 34. 
46 Id. at 35. 
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competent authorities are to be officially designated by each Member 
State for the purpose of the Regulation.
47
  
 This notification should be of great interest for financial market 
authorities. It will provide them with adequate data to monitor short 
selling and bring enforcement actions under the Market Abuse 
Directive.
48
 This notification system will also enable financial market 
authorities to compile statistics about short selling. The data will be 
accurate because the notification requirement covers net short positions 
created by trading shares not only on trading venues but also on over-the-
counter markets. Moreover, notification of net short positions, which 
take into account long positions used to close out short sales, is more 
accurate than the disclosure of gross short positions in assessing the 
potential risks stemming from short sellers’ activity. The costs associated 
with this notification requirement could be dissuasive and limit short 
selling activity. However, short sellers already calculate their net short 
positions for the purpose of monitoring risks and exposure. Even though 
short sellers could be required to amend their calculation methods to 
comply with the Regulation, marginal costs would be limited and largely 
outweighed by the benefits derived from the notification requirement.  
 
3. Public Disclosure of Net Short Positions 
 
 Article 6 of the Regulation requires short sellers who have a net short 
position to publicly disclose details of the position whenever it reaches or 
falls below 0.5 percent of the issued share capital of the company. Each 
0.1 percent above that threshold shall also be disclosed to the public. 
This disclosure threshold is much lower than the disclosure threshold for 
long positions, which is set at 5 percent in both the European Union
49
 
and the United States.
50
 
 Public disclosure of net short positions by short sellers will lower the 
information acquisition costs of other market participants. Following 
                                                        
47 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 32. Certainly, the French AMF, the German Bundesanstalt für 
Finanzdienstleistungsaufsicht (BAFin), the Spanish Comision Nacional del Mercado de Valores 
(CNMV), the Italian Commissione Nazionale per le Società e la Borsa (CONSOB), the Hellenic 
Capital Market Commission (HCMC), etc. 
48 Directive 2003/6 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 28 January 2003 on 
Insider Dealing and Market Manipulation (Market Abuse), 2003 O.J. (L 96) 16.  
49 Directive 2004/109 of the European Parliament and of the Council of 15 December 2004 on 
the Harmonisation of Transparency Requirements in Relation to Information About Issuers Whose 
Securities are Admitted to Trading on a Regulated Market and Amending Directive 2001/34/EC, art. 
9.1, 2004 O.J. (L 390) 38, 47. 
50 Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78m(d)(1) (2011). 
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Gilson and Kraakman, this will strengthen market efficiency in its semi-
strong form. The incorporation of information into market prices will 
become faster because whenever a net short position held by a short 
seller reaches or falls below the 0.5 percent threshold, all other market 
participants will receive this information the following business day and 
will be able to act on this information.  
 Still, such a requirement raises some serious concerns. Since short 
sellers must disclose their identity, a herdlike behavior will arise (that is, 
the disclosure of well-known managers’ positions will lead other market 
participants to adopt the same strategy). This irrational aspect of 
financial markets is well-developed in behavioral finance as a critique of 
the efficient capital market hypothesis. In his seminal book, Shiller 
explains how “[such] behavior, although individually rational, produces 
group behavior that is, in a well-defined sense, irrational.”51 As a result, 
all market participants will follow the trend set by star managers, and 
market movements will no longer reflect the fundamental value of 
companies’ equity.  
 Furthermore, public disclosure of net short positions and 
identification of short sellers will facilitate retaliation by issuers, 
including belligerent statements, legal actions, and short squeezes, even 
when short selling is justified by the underlying financial situation of any 
given company. Such risks would deter short sellers from acting and 
would undermine market efficiency. As a result, investors will invest less 
in markets where public disclosure is required and begin to allocate 
capital to markets “with more palatable regulatory frameworks.”52 The 
fear that regulation will unduly interfere with market allocation of 
resources materializes here. 
 An alternative solution was suggested by the AIMA
53
 and in the 
Report of the European Parliament that could have alleviated these fears 
without calling into question the benefit of public disclosure for market 
efficiency. The alternative solution was that the public disclosure of net 
short positions should not identify the holder of the net short position 
(that is, the public disclosure should be made in an anonymous form). 
                                                        
51 ROBERT J. SHILLER, IRRATIONAL EXUBERANCE (Princeton University Press ed., 2005). 
52 Oliver Wyman, The Effects of Short Selling Public Disclosure Regimes on Equity Markets – 
A Comparative Analysis of US and European Markets at 29 (2010), available at 
.http://www.oliverwyman.com/ow/pdf_files/OW_EN_FS_PUBL_2010_Short_Selling.pdf.  
53 Alternative Investment Management Association, Position Paper on the European 
Commission’s Proposal for a Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit Default 
Swaps, 7 (Dec. 2010) (position paper), available at 
http://www.aima.org/en/knowledge_centre/regulatory-and-tax/position-papers.cfm. 
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Indeed, this solution could have alleviated the fears of herding and 
retaliation. 
 
B. Toward the Implementation of a Marking Regime? 
 
 In addition to the transparency regime, the Commission is invited to 
consider, in the context of the revision of the Markets in Financial 
Instruments Directive, whether inclusion by investment firms of 
information about short sales in transaction reports to competent 
authorities would provide useful supplementary information to enable 
competent authorities to monitor levels of short selling. Such a 
requirement would enable market authorities to gain information about 
intraday short sales.  
 In the United States, Rule 200(g) of Regulation SHO requires 
brokers or dealers to mark all sell orders of any equity security as “long,” 
“short,” or “short exempt.”54  
 The implementation of a marking regime would raise serious 
concerns. The benefits stemming from such a requirement are limited 
because the requirement does not cover over-the-counter short sales and 
cannot be used to evaluate the outstanding short positions in the market 
or spot any large short position.
55
 The picture will be incomplete and 
misleading. Moreover, the implementation of a marking regime will be 
highly costly. According to the UK Financial Services Authority (FSA):  
 
[W]ork carried out by the FSA indicates that a flagging regime 
would be prohibitively expensive to introduce. The limited 
benefits that it would bring would not justify the very high 
implementation and compliance costs (which could be as high as 
£2m per firm according to responses to a survey we conducted in 
2009).
56
 
 
These costs will be particularly high in the European Union because only 
Greece already has the infrastructures required to implement a marking 
                                                        
54 17 C.F.R. § 242.200(g) (2012). 
55 Report of Committee of European Securities Regulators, Model for a Pan-European Short 
Selling Disclosure Regime, at 6, CESR/10-088 (Mar. 2010), available at 
http://www.esma.europa.eu/system/files/10_088.pdf.. 
56 Alternative Investment Management Association, supra note 49, at 8. 
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regime. The costs will be high for both short sellers and trading venues.
57
 
A marking regime does not withstand a sensible cost-benefit analysis.  
 
III. REGULATION OF UNCOVERED OR NAKED SHORT SALES 
 
 The Regulation requires all short sellers to comply with a “locate” 
requirement (A). Moreover, the Regulation designs specific buy-in 
procedures (B). 
 
A. “Locate” Requirement 
 
 Under Article 12 of the Regulation, a short seller may enter into a 
short sale only of a share admitted to trading on a trading venue if (i) she 
borrowed the share or made alternative provisions resulting in a similar 
legal effect; (ii) she entered into an “agreement” to borrow the share or 
has another absolutely enforceable claim under contract or property law 
to obtain ownership of a corresponding number of securities of the same 
class so that settlement can be effected when it is due; or (iii) she has 
confirmed that the share has been located and took “measures” vis-à-vis 
a third party necessary to have a “reasonable expectation” that settlement 
can be effected when it is due.
58
  
 When, prior to a short sale in shares, a short seller borrowed the 
share or entered into an agreement to borrow the share, the short sale is 
“covered” and there is no settlement risk. On the other hand, when a 
short seller has “reasonable expectation” that settlement can be effected 
only when it is due, the short sale is “uncovered” or “naked,” and there is 
settlement risk on delivery date. Under this “locate” approach, a short 
seller shall perform the “locate” prior to executing a short sale, and a 
corresponding “locate” shall be matched to each short sale. Initially, the 
European Commission considered the implementation of a “locate and 
reserve” requirement pursuant to which a short seller must at least have 
an arrangement with a third party under which the third party has 
confirmed that the share has been located and reserved for lending. The 
implementation of such requirement would have outlawed uncovered or 
naked short selling, usually classified as manipulative per se because 
short sellers can short sell more than 100 percent of the issued share 
                                                        
57 Committee of European Securities Regulators, supra note 50, at 6. 
58 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 12. 
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capital of a company, dramatically increasing the downward pressure on 
a particular security and the risk of settlement failures.
59
 
 The manner in which short sellers could satisfy the “reasonable 
expectation” requirement will be determined by the European Securities 
and Markets Authority (ESMA), taking into account the intraday trading 
and the liquidity of the shares. In the United States, Rule 203(b)(1) of 
Regulation SHO, which requires broker-dealers to borrow or “locate” 
securities before any short sales, allows reliance upon blanket assurances 
or so-called “easy to borrow” lists to comply with the locate requirement 
without directly contacting the source of the borrowed security.
60
  
 Naked short selling is not outlawed. However, manipulative or 
abusive naked short selling is still subject to investigation and 
enforcement actions brought by regulators pursuant to the Market Abuse 
Directive.
61
 As Gruenewald, Wagner, and Weber observed, “naked short 
selling is not actually a special case compared to conventional short 
selling in terms of its economic implications” and does not require 
specific regulatory impediments.
62
  
 Moreover, there is no need to rule out non-manipulative and non-
abusive short selling because the risk of settlement failure is efficiently 
addressed by buy-in procedures and fines for late settlement. 
 
B. Buy-In Procedures 
 
 Under Article 15 of the Regulation, a central counterparty in a 
Member State that provides clearing services for shares shall monitor 
whether a short seller fails to deliver the shares within four business days 
after the day on which settlement is due. If not, procedures are 
automatically triggered for the buy-in of the shares to ensure delivery for 
settlement. When the central counterparty is not able to buy-in the 
shares, an amount is paid to the buyer based on the value of the shares to 
                                                        
59 Id. 
60 17 C.F.R. § 242.203(b)(1) (2012).  In the draft implementing technical standards submitted 
by the ESMA to the Commission, the ESMA also referred to “easy to borrow” shares.   
61 Seraina Gruenewald, Alexander Wagner, & Rolf Weber, Short Selling Regulation after the 
Financial Crisis – First Principles Revisited, 7 INT’L J. DISCLOSURE & GOVERNANCE 108, 129 
(2010). 
62 Id. at 129–30. However, in addition to Section 10(b) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 
and Rule 10b-5, the SEC adopted Rule 10b-21, a naked short selling antifraud rule. Under Rule 10b-
21, it is unlawful for any person to submit an order to sell a security if that person deceives a broker-
dealer, participant of a registered clearing agency, or purchaser regarding his/her intention, or ability, 
to deliver the security by settlement date and that person fails to deliver the security by settlement 
date. 
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be delivered at the delivery date, plus an amount for losses incurred by 
the buyer as a result of the settlement failure. The short seller will 
reimburse all amounts paid. 
 These buy-in procedures are not an incentive for short sellers to 
recklessly engage in naked short selling because short sellers who fail to 
deliver the shares by the settlement date have the obligation to make 
daily payments for each day the failure continues. These payments or 
fines for late settlement “shall be sufficiently high to act as a deterrent to 
natural or legal persons failing to settle.”63 The buy-in procedures and 
fines will efficiently deter naked short sellers from failing to deliver 
because they will be worse off once the central counterparty acts. 
 In the United States, close-out requirements focus on participants of 
a clearing agency and broker-dealers. Under Rule 204(a) and (b) of 
Regulation SHO, if a participant of a registered clearing agency has a 
“fail to deliver”64 relating to a short sale with respect to any equity 
securities, the participant must immediately close out the position by 
either borrowing or purchasing the shares before the beginning of trading 
hours on the first settlement day after the settlement date. Moreover, the 
participant and any broker-dealer from which it receives trades become 
subject to the so-called “pre-borrow penalty.”65 This requires the 
participant to first borrow or arrange to borrow the security before 
accepting any short sales orders or effecting short sales for its own 
account in the security, until the “fail to deliver” is closed out by 
purchasing (not borrowing) the relevant security. Because Rule 204 
applies to all equity securities, it eliminates the close-out requirement for 
“threshold securities” (that is, securities that experience large and 
persistent failures to deliver) under Rule 203(b)(3) of Regulation SHO.
66
 
 Buy-ins and fines for late settlement are necessary to mitigate risks 
of settlement failure resulting from “naked” short sales. Moreover, 
relying on buy-in procedures and fines for late settlement is a better 
alternative to prevent settlement disruption than an outright ban on 
“naked” short selling through the implementation of a “locate and 
reserve” requirement. First, the “locate and reserve” requirement would 
restrict all naked short sales whereas the buy-in procedures and fines 
discriminate by targeting only short sellers who fail to deliver. Second, 
the “locate and reserve” requirement would “suck liquidity out of the 
                                                        
63 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 15(2). 
64 17 C.F.R. § 272.204 (a)–(b) 
65 Id. 
66 Id. 
SPRING 2012                                                 Regulating Short Selling in Europe 
 
80 
 
market, pushing up the cost of borrowing, leading to hoarding of 
securities.”67 Every short seller contemplating a covered or naked short 
sale would suffer from this liquidity drain and escalation in borrowing 
costs. On the other hand, the buy-in procedures and fines are painful only 
for short sellers who fail to deliver. Third, even if the buy-in procedures 
are costly for a buyer who faces the risk of late delivery or cash 
compensation instead of delivery of the purchased security, the costs of 
the “locate and reserve” requirement would be far greater for both short 
sellers (because of high borrowing costs, hoarding of security, and 
liquidity drain) and buyers (because of liquidity drain).  
 
IV. IMPLEMENTATION OF CIRCUIT BREAKER RULES 
  
 Once circuit breaker rules are triggered by either “exceptional 
situations” or a “significant fall in price” (A), there is some cause for 
concern because of a foreseeable lack of coordination (B), and a 
potentially disruptive impact on the efficiency of financial markets (C). 
 
A. Triggering Events: “Exceptional Situations” and a  
“Significant Fall in Price” 
 
 The Regulation implements new curbs to prevent short selling in 
battered stocks. In case of adverse events or developments (“exceptional 
situations” which constitute a serious threat to financial stability and 
market confidence) or a significant fall in price, the competent authority 
of each Member State has far-reaching powers of intervention to require 
further transparency or to impose restrictions on short selling.
68
 In the 
European Commission’s own words, adverse events or developments 
include “not just financial or economic events but also for example 
natural disasters or terrorist acts.”69 With respect to a significant fall in 
price, pursuant to Article 23(5) of the Regulation, a decline of 10 percent 
or more in the case of a liquid share shall be deemed a significant fall in 
price.
70
 
                                                        
67 Alternative Investment Management Association, supra note 56, at 4. 
68 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 1. 
69 Proposal for a Regulation of the European Parliament and of the Council on Short Selling 
and Certain Aspects of Credit Default Swaps, COM (2010) 482 final (Sept. 15, 2010), available at 
http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/securities/docs/short_selling/20100915_proposal_en.pdf. 
70 With respect to illiquid shares and other classes of financial instruments, the fall in value 
shall be an amount specified by the Commission. 
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 In exceptional situations, the competent authority has the power to 
require further transparency of net short positions in relation to a specific 
financial instrument or class of financial instruments (of which 
transparency is not already required under Articles 5 to 8 of the 
Regulation) reaching or falling below a notification threshold fixed by 
the competent authority.
71
 The competent authority may also prohibit or 
impose conditions relating to persons entering into a short sale or other 
transaction that creates, or relates to, a financial instrument that confers a 
financial advantage on the person in the event of a decrease in the price 
or value of another financial instrument.
72
 These measures may apply to 
transactions concerning all financial instruments, financial instruments of 
a specific class, or a specific financial instrument.
73
 Restrictions will be 
valid for an initial period not exceeding three months but will be 
renewable for further periods limited to three months at a time (Article 
24 of the Regulation).
74
  
 Where the price of a financial instrument on a trading venue is 
experiencing significant downward price pressure, the competent 
authority shall consider whether it is appropriate to prohibit or restrict 
short sellers from engaging in short selling of the financial instrument on 
the trading venue or otherwise limit transactions in that financial 
instrument on that trading venue “in order to prevent a disorderly decline 
in the price of the financial instruments.”75 This measure applies for the 
rest of the day (First Trading Day) and the following day (Second 
Trading Day). If, at the end of the Second Trading Day, there is a further 
significant fall in value from the closing price of the First Trading Day 
(that is, 5 percent or more for liquid shares),
76
 the competent authority 
may renew the measure for a further period of two trading days after the 
end of the Second Trading Day.
77
 
 On February 24, 2010, the SEC adopted a new circuit breaker rule 
(the so-called alternative uptick rule) that places price restrictions on 
short selling when a stock is experiencing significant downward price 
pressure. When a security’s price declines by 10 percent or more from 
the prior day’s closing price, Rule 201 of Regulation SHO prevents the 
                                                        
71 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 18. 
72 Id. art. 20. 
73 Id. 
74 Id. art. 24. 
75 Id. art. 23. 
76 Or, with respect to illiquid shares, half or the amount specified by the Commission pursuant 
to Article 23(5) of the Regulation. 
77 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 23 
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execution or display of a short sale order of a “covered security” at a 
price that is less than or equal to the current national best bid.
78
 On 
March 13, 2011, 54 securities listed on the New York Stock Exchange 
(NYSE) and the NYSE Amex triggered the circuit breaker, dragged by a 
significant fall in Japan’s Nikkei Stock Average amid widespread 
worries about the impact of the 9.0 earthquake, the ensuing tsunami, and 
the nuclear power catastrophe. In particular, short selling was curbed in 
U.S.-listed shares of Hitachi, Cameco Corporation, Uranium Resources, 
and Uranium Energy Corporation.
79
 
 
B. Foreseeable Lack of Coordination 
 
 At first glance, the Regulation seems to design an efficient 
supervisory framework that harmonizes and coordinates Members 
States’ interventions.  
 Before implementing or renewing any measure required to face 
exceptional situations and before imposing any other measure required to 
confront a significant fall in price, any given competent authority 
(Primary Competent Authority) shall notify its E.U. counterparts and the 
ESMA.
80
 This notification shall include details about the classes of 
instruments and transactions targeted by the measure as well as evidence 
supporting the implementation of such measure and its proposed 
effective date.
81
 Upon receipt of such notification, each E.U. competent 
authority may decide to take any measure within its own jurisdiction it 
deems necessary to assist the Primary Competent Authority, in 
accordance with Articles 18 to 23 of the Regulation. E.U. capital markets 
being highly intertwined, this assistance is crucial to ensure the 
effectiveness of any measure contemplated by the Primary Competent 
Authority. However, one might worry (more on this in a moment) that 
other competent authorities will always succeed in finding a colorable 
                                                        
78 Rule 201 of Regulation SHO defines “covered security” to mean any “NMS stock.” Rule 
600(b)(47) of Regulation NMS defines an “NMS stock” as “any NMS security other than an option.” 
See 17 C.F.R. § 242.201(a)(1) (2012). Rule 600(b)(46) of Regulation NMS defines an “NMS 
security” as “any security or class of securities for which transaction reports are collected, processed, 
and made available pursuant to an effective transaction reporting plan, or an effective national 
market system plan for reporting transactions in listed options.” See 17 C.F.R. § 242.600(b)(46) 
(2012). The circuit breaker will therefore affect all securities, except options, traded on an exchange 
or over the counter. 
79 Kristina Peterson, NYSE Sees Second Most Active Day of Short-Sale Curbs, DOW JONES 
NEWSWIRES, Mar. 14, 2011. 
80 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 26. 
81 The notification shall be made no less than 24 hours before the intended effective date of the 
measure, unless exceptional situations make it impossible to give a 24-hour notice. See Id. art. 26(3). 
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argument as to the “necessity” to follow the Primary Competent 
Authority and intervene in their own jurisdiction, even in the absence of 
any exceptional situation or significant fall in price, bypassing the 
original impediments of Articles 18 to 23 of the Regulation.  
 The Regulation entrusts the ESMA with “a facilitation and 
coordination role” as to measures taken by E.U. competent authorities. 
Under Article 27(1) of the Regulation, the “ESMA shall ensure that a 
consistent approach is taken by competent authorities regarding measures 
taken under Section 1 Powers of competent authorities especially 
regarding when it is necessary to use powers of intervention under 
Section 1, the nature of any measures imposed and the commencement 
and duration of any measures.”82 In particular, after receiving notification 
of measures to be imposed or renewed because of an “exceptional 
situation,”83 the ESMA shall issue an opinion, published on its website 
within 24 hours, on whether the measure or proposed measure is 
necessary to address the situation.
84
 Specifically, the ESMA shall address 
whether the adverse events or developments constitute “a serious threat 
to financial stability or to market confidence in one or more Member 
States, whether the measure or proposed measure is appropriate and 
proportionate to address the threat, and whether the proposed duration of 
any such measure is justified.”85 However, the thrust of the ESMA’s 
opinions is not far-reaching. Indeed, E.U. competent authorities shall 
only comply or explain:  
 
Where a competent authority proposes to take or takes measures 
contrary to an ESMA opinion under Article 27(2) or declines to 
take measures contrary to an ESMA opinion under that article 
it shall publish on its website within 24 hours of receiving the 
ESMA opinion a notice fully explaining its reasons for doing 
so.
86
 
 
Therefore, the ESMA does not have the legal authority to prevent E.U. 
competent authorities from implementing, at their sole discretion, 
incoherent approaches throughout the European Union.  
                                                        
82 Id. art. 27. 
83 There is no need for an opinion when measures are taken to face a significant decrease in 
price. 
84 Regulation, supra note 2, art. 27. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
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 The Regulation is so prone to tilt the playing field against short 
sellers that it empowers the ESMA with its own powers of intervention. 
The ESMA can require enhanced disclosure of net short positions, 
prohibit or constrain short selling and prevent either natural or legal 
persons from entering into certain transactions relating to a financial 
instrument in two situations.
87
 The first occurs when there is a threat to 
the orderly functioning and integrity of financial markets or to the 
stability of the whole or part of the financial system in the European 
Union with cross border implications. The second occurs when a 
competent authority or competent authorities have not taken measures to 
address the threat or measures that have been taken do not adequately 
address the threat. Before taking those measures, the ESMA shall 
consult, when appropriate, the European Systemic Risk Board and other 
relevant authorities.
88
 According to Article 28(3) of the Regulation, the 
ESMA shall also take into account the extent to which the measure:  
 
(a) significantly addresses the threat to the orderly functioning 
and integrity of financial markets or the stability of the whole or 
part of the financial system in the Union or will significantly 
improve the ability of competent authorities to monitor the 
threat; (b) does not create a risk of regulatory arbitrage; (c) does 
not have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of financial 
markets, including by reducing liquidity in those markets or 
creating uncertainty for market participants, that is 
disproportionate to the benefits of the measure.
89
  
 
This analysis reveals that the Regulation suggests requiring stricter 
constraints on the ESMA’s intervention powers than on other E.U. 
competent authorities. This seems to be incoherent with the Regulation’s 
primary objective (that is, designing a consistent and harmonized 
approach to short selling in the European Union).
90
  
 The Regulation gives legal authority to every E.U. competent 
authority to interfere with market mechanisms, without entrusting the 
ESMA with real harmonizing powers. Incoherent temporary restrictions 
on short selling might thrive, which is even more worrisome considering 
                                                        
87 Id. art. 28. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 Id. art. 1. 
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the true impact of temporary restrictions on the functioning of capital 
markets. 
 
C. Negative Consequences of Temporary Restrictions 
 
 Academic literature provides strong evidence that short selling is not 
responsible for market volatility or negative market moves and that short 
selling constraints are highly disruptive. 
 In December 2008, the SEC Office of Economic Analysis issued a 
memorandum to Christopher Cox, then-Chairman of the SEC, describing 
short selling activity during the first weeks of September 2008, just 
before the implementation of a short sale ban on financial stocks. The 
analysis suggests that during periods of extreme negative returns, “sell 
pressure is more intense for long trades indicating that short sales put less 
pressure on prices than other sales during periods of extreme negative 
returns.”91 This suggests that a significant decrease in price in periods of 
extreme negative returns might be a consequence of long investors’ 
actions rather than short sellers’ actions, which undermines the rationale 
for government intervention. 
 In their study of the 2008 naked short sales restrictions in the United 
States, Boulton and Braga-Alves show that short sale restrictions have a 
negative impact on liquidity as bid-ask spreads widen and trading 
volumes decrease.
92
 Moreover, they find no evidence that these 
restrictions reduce volatility.
93
 On the contrary, they find that volatility 
increases and conclude that market quality is affected during the 
restricted period.
94
 What we should learn from this study is clear: short 
sales constraints have a detrimental effect on market efficiency.  
 Beber and Pagano also suggested that short selling restrictions are 
detrimental to liquidity (“especially for stocks with small market 
capitalization, high volatility and no listed options”), slow the price 
discovery process, and fail to support stock prices (except possibly for 
U.S. financial stocks).
95
 
                                                        
91 Memorandum of the SEC Office of Economic Analysis, Analysis of Short Selling Activity 
During the First Weeks of September 2008 (Dec. 16, 2008), available at 
http://www.sec.gov/comments/s7-08-09/s70809-369.pdf. 
92 Thomas J.Boulton & MarcusV. Braga-Alves, The Skinny on the 2008 Naked Short Sale 
Restrictions, 13 J. FIN. MARKETS 4, 5 (2010). 
93 Id. 
94 Id. 
95 Alessandro Beber & Marco Pagano, Short-Selling Bans Around the World: Evidence from 
the 2007-09 Crisis (Aug. 2011) (unpublished working paper), available at 
http://ssrn.com/abstract=1502184. 
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 As a consequence, E.U. competent authorities should restrain 
themselves and admit that restricting short selling actually aggravates the 
disorderly functioning of financial markets, even in the midst of a 
financial crisis.  
 
 
 
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
 The Regulation on Short Selling and Certain Aspects of Credit 
Default Swaps will implement reasonable rules applicable to naked short 
selling but will implement flawed transparency rules (specifically public 
disclosure of short sellers’ identity and future implementation of a 
marking regime). More seriously, this Regulation entrusts competent 
authorities of Member States and the ESMA with far-reaching powers of 
intervention. As a consequence, incoherent approaches will interfere with 
market mechanisms, in particular with the price discovery process, 
undermining the European Union’s competitiveness. The regulatory 
patchwork that emerged during the Crisis will materialize again in the 
future. As Tett observed,  
 
“[A]n age of bureaucrat hubris creates new risks. History is 
littered with examples where officials have tried to control 
financial flows and set prices, with disastrous results. It would be 
foolish to expect bureaucrats to be any less fallible today, given 
that finance is doubly complex and bureaucrats (like bankers) 
have warped incentives.”96 
 
There are no atheists in foxholes. And there are no libertarians in crises. 
                                                        
96 Gillian Tett, Beware a Hegelian Touch of Regulatory Hubris, FIN. TIMES, Sept. 15, 2011. 
